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THE LAND REFORM OF THE 1830s IN SERBIA:  
THE IMPACT OF THE SHATTERING OF THE  
OTTOMAN PROPERTY SYSTEM1
The paper concerns the process of weakening of the Ottoman property system in Serbia after the 
Serbian uprisings, particularly in the period of 1815–1830, its subsequent abolition by the Hatt-i hu-
mayun of 1830 and the introduction of a modern system of private property in the 1830s, culminating 
with the Restoration of lands Act in 1839. This reform, although beyond any doubt useful both for the 
economy and for the legal system of Serbia, was also accompanied by frequent abuse of the rights of 
peasants by rich (large) landowners, including the ruler of Serbia, Prince (Knjaz) Miloš himself. Such 
a course of action caused great displeasure in the general population, resulting in numerous peasant 
revolts (the most important being Đak’s revolt of 1824 and Mileta’s revolt of 1835), which, in turn, im-
pacted the reform process again. The paper shows the legal consequences of the new concept of prop-
erty rights, their impact upon the dominantly rural society of Serbia and the intricate interrelationship 
of the revolts and the reform process. Refs 62.
Keywords: land reform, private property, abolishment of the Ottoman timar system, peasant 
revolts, legal history, Serbia, Miloš Obrenović.
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INTRODUCTION
Serbia has been under Ottoman rule from 1459 until 1878: it has been a long and tu-
multuous period of serving foreign masters and living under foreign law. The entire 19th 
century presents a gradual process of liberation, of gaining first more and more autonomy, 
and finally independence. As Nedeljković2 has pointed out, the agrarian question and the 
yearning for economic liberation of private property has been at the root of practically all 
wars and uprisings in Serbia since the First Serbian uprising of 1804 all the way to the Bal-
kan Wars of 1912 [1, p. 2]; it could be argued that the issue arose even earlier [2, p. 38–42], 
and Srdanović-Barać has called the process “agrarian revolution” [3]. Of course, pointing 
out this factor doesn’t mean denying the national and political nature of these conflicts.
The focus and the scope of this article do not allow for a detailed exposition of the 
events of the uprisings, or, as Ranke called them, the Serbian Revolution [4]: they will be 
Kršljanin Nina — PhD, assistant professor at the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, Department of 
Legal History; nina.krsljanin@ius.bg.ac.rs
1 This article is a modified version of the paper presented at the conference Old and New Worlds: The 
Global Challenges of Rural History in Lisbon, 27–30 January 2016.
2 Serbian names and terms are given in Serbian Latin spelling, while the usual English transcription is 
used for Turkish names and terminology.
© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2017
Вестник СПбГУ. Право. 2017. Т. 8. Вып. 1 27
mentioned only briefly. However, the period between the Second Serbian uprising and 
the Hatt-i sherif (Hatt-i humayun) that granted Serbia autonomy (1815–1830) deserves to 
be covered in more detail, since it shows the struggle for both political emancipation and 
agrarian reform.
THE OTTOMAN PROPERTY SYSTEM AND THE SERBIAN UPRISINGS
After the conquest of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, the old 
system of land property (baština) was replaced by a completely different system of prop-
erty.3 In it, the land belonged to God, or the Sultan as his regent on Earth, while the sipahi 
(horsemen in the army) only held parts of it (timar, zeamet, has) with the right to collect 
various tolls from the inhabitants4; they did not own the land and thus could not sell it 
or leave it to their heirs.5 At first, some of the Serbian nobility who swore fealty to the 
Sultan also became sipahi; but after a while the privilege was available only to Muslims 
[9, p. 216–217]. On the other hand, the peasants inhabiting the lands, formerly owners of 
their plots, were considered to have merely lease in the Ottoman system.6 However, they 
could sell their land if they obtained the sipahi’s consent — which after a while became 
just a formality that a special tax, tapu, was paid for, and a certificate received in return7, 
and their sons could inherit the same rights. Furthermore, Ottoman regulations for the 
territory of Serbia continued to use the word baština to signify their rights. Thus peasants 
still believed that they had private property, as in ages past (and considered the tapu to 
be proof of property),8 leading to the paradox of the serf seemingly having more rights to 
his land than the feudal lord. Still, the sipahi’s consent was needed even for such things 
as the erection of buildings or the choice of culture to be planted on the land [1, p. 84–89, 
98–111].
Some of the Sultan’s land, however, was not given to the sipahi, but was leased out 
to various persons, who paid the rent for it on a yearly basis; such lands were known as 
mouqat’a. Although their regime was different in the government’s eyes, the duties of peas-
3 The Ottoman system is usually referred to as feudal in Serbian literature. However, Nedeljković 
warned against using this term, since the Western European feudalism has completely different relations 
between the noble landowner and the serf; still, he acknowledged that there was much greater similarity 
regarding property rights [1, p. 333–335; cf. 5, p. 464]. Some modern scholars, likewise, think that the system 
cannot be considered feudal because it does not fully correspond to Western feudalism. See [6, p. 19–24] 
and references there.
4 The main among those was 10% of the gathered crops, but there were many others, relating to other 
agricultural activities (e. g. growing fruit, making honey, milling flour) as well as relevant occasions in the 
peasants’ life (weddings, deaths); for a detailed list of these as well as taxes owed to the government regardless 
of land ownership, see [7, p. 274–318; 8, p. 361–364, 382–440; 1, p. 89–98].
5 There were also smaller pieces of land that where given to the sipahi for their personal use; in Serbia, 
those were called aliya. Many sipahi leased out those lands as well [1, p. 111–115].
6 As Nedeljković points out, “whoever was, in the period before the Ottoman conquest, a landowner 
(baštinik) — either a nobleman or a free man — he stopped being one” [1, p. 56].
7 The proper name of the certificate was tapunama, but the word tapu (tapija in Serbian) was also used.
8 Ninčić considered baština to be private property even under the Turks, but Nedeljković refuted his 
arguments, proving that the legal characteristics of baština under Ottoman rule show that it was a form of 
hereditary lease; as was already pointed out elsewhere, another flaw of Ninčić’s argumentation is that it relied 
heavily on Roman law, which is incompatible with the concepts of property in the Sharia system. See [10, 
p. 10–25; 1, p. 104–111; 11, p. 6–7]. Novaković, on the other hand, compared the old baštinik and the owner 
of the chiftlik (see below) [9, p. 221–224].
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ants who lived there were the same as on the lands of the sipahi. Finally, a form of private 
property — mulq — did exist in the Sharia system, but in Serbia it was mostly limited to 
land and buildings in cities [1, p. 341–343; 5, p. 468].9 
Of course, the rules of the system were frequently broken and abused. One of such 
abuses was the forceful introduction of chiftlik, an institute close to private property, which 
was originally bestowed by the Sultan to distinguished individuals, but usually on barren 
land. In the late 16th century, however, janissaries started seizing land from baštiniks or 
even sipahi10 and forcing the peasants to pay a high rent (and provide kuluk — mandatory 
free labour) in order to be able to use their own land — of course, in addition to the rent 
legally owed to the sipahi [16, p. 390–395; 1, p. 122–134]. All of this was very hard on the 
people, since the main occupation of the Serbian population at the time was agriculture in 
its broadest sense, mainly animal husbandry [17, p. 126–135; 3, p. 29–38; 18, p. 25–28; 19, 
p. 166–176; 20, p. 9–14].
Particularly since the Austro-Turkish wars of the late 17th and early 18th century, 
the territory of Serbia witnessed several rapid changes between relatively mild and com-
pletely legal regimes and periods of great peril, exploitation and abuse of power [21; 22, 
p. 146–237; 19, p. 13–24.]. The last and worst of these was the period of the rule of the rebel 
janissaries (dahiyas, 1801–1804), which led to the First Serbian uprising in 1804 — which, 
in turn, tied in to the Russo-Turkish war of 1806–1812. Although the Treaty of Bucharest 
obliged the Ottoman Empire, among other things, to give autonomy and amnesty to the 
Serbs, the Porte took advantage of Russia’s war with Napoleon and put a bloody end to 
the insurrectional Serbian state, ignoring the treaty.11 However, as the rule of the new 
Belgrade vizier, Suleyman Pasha, became as brutal as that of the janissaries, the Second 
Serbian uprising broke out under the lead of Miloš Obrenović — this one short and effi-
cient, prudently finalised by negotiations when the military force of the insurgents started 
weakening.12
THE PERIOD OF DUAL GOVERNMENT (1815–1830) AND  
REVOLTS OF THAT TIME
The period after the Second Serbian uprising has been called period dvovlašća by Ser-
bian authors — the period of dual government — due to the parallel existence of Ottoman 
and Serbian government structures. (Another term in use is “half-autonomy” [19, p. 69].) 
This period is considered to start with the treaty of Miloš Obrenović and Marashli Ali 
Pasha, which ended the uprising. The treaty concerns primarily judicial and taxation mat-
9 For these and other institutes of the Sharia and Ottoman property law see [12, p. 1–25; 1, p. 16–42, 
66–122; 13, p. 337–434; 14, p. 98–121; 15].
10 As Todorović points out, this causes a peculiar case of the obtainer of the land having more right to 
it than the person he obtained it from [5, p. 471–472]. This is just additional proof of the illegal introduction 
of chiftlik into Serbia.
11 To learn more about the events of this period, see [23, p. 137–165; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28, p. 178–183; 
29, p. 193–202; 30, p. 7–95]. For the transformation of property during the uprising, see [1, p. 139–165; 3, 
p. 51–59].
12 The uprising was preceded by another revolt against the Turks  — Hadži-Prodan’s  — but Miloš 
helped the Ottoman authorities quench it (with as little bloodshed as possible), not out of loyalty, but 
because he thought the time wasn’t yet ripe for an uprising. For more details on these events, see [31, p. 6–30; 
32, p. 56–133; 33; 23, p. 165–174; 30, p. 96–108].
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ters, and does not make major changes in the general Ottoman government or property 
regime13 — although the feudal rent within it was reduced to a legal minimum [1, p. 172–
173; 19, p. 70–73]. However, during this fifteen-year period, many de facto changes were 
introduced by Miloš Obrenović, some of them pertaining to or affecting land ownership.14
Miloš did his best to control the sipahi with various uses and abuses of his authority, 
thus greatly reducing their power [8, p. 295–307; 1, p. 174; 19, p. 74–80]. By 1819, he had 
successfully expelled the chiftlik from Serbia15, but he also fought those of the sipahi that 
were demanding illegal kinds and amounts of tolls from the people [8, p. 364–372; 35, 
p. 43–49]. In 1816, he started leasing the mouqat’a, until at last all were under his control, 
and leased them out in turn to the local elders16, mostly his relatives and supporters [1, 
p. 174–175; 8, p. 372–381].17 This led to a slightly paradoxical situation — that the Serbian 
authorities were more willing to help the plight of those peasants who lived and worked 
under Turkish than under Serbian lords. Miloš was always ready to help in any conflict 
between the peasants and the sipahi and to fight for the reduction of taxes the peasants 
were paying. However, he and his supporters had frequently raised those very tolls on the 
lands that they were leasing, and many people did not dare complain; when they did, their 
suits and complaints frequently yielded no results [8, p. 379; 2, p. 53–57, 207–209]. Simi-
larly, while Miloš strived to reduce kuluk demanded by the Turks (Ottoman population) 
to a minimum, he and the other elders also demanded free labour on their lands from the 
peasants — a relationship that was easily and frequently abused, leading to great dissatis-
faction of the people [8, p. 438–440, 486–496].
In order to increase the country’s population and to lure in settlers from other Otto-
man territories and Austria, Miloš gave them abandoned land, introduced temporary tax 
exemptions and allowed them to cut the forest in order to occupy more land for settling. 
The measures were very successful and caused a dramatic increase in population, but they 
also caused great displeasure in the local population, who saw the newcomers as intruders 
with undeserved privileges. They were frequently forced to leave villages where they had 
first settled, while their property was looted by the local population; however, this only 
caused the privileges to increase, with Miloš even commanding that land be taken away 
from those who have too much of it and given to the new settlers. Although many authors 
claimed that he was against large landowners, the actual reason was merely the ability to 
cultivate the land [8, p. 254–255; 19, p. 192–196; 37, p. 68–69; 38, p. 483]. After a while, 
13 In his history of the Ottoman Empire, Kia presents it as if Serbia gained autonomy right after the 
Second Serbian uprising, which was only formally recognized after the Treaty of Edirne; such a view must 
be considered incorrect [34, p. 106–109].
14 Of course, other highly relevant changes have been introduced in other areas. For example, on 
Miloš’s changes in administration and especially the judicial system, see [8, p. 287–295, 308–327].
15 Miloš asked for that in 1815 and Marashli agreed, but the Porte confirmed it only in 1819 [1, p. 172–
173].
16 It should be noted that the elders in question were merely holders of important local functions 
and those who have distinguished themselves during the uprising; there was no noble class in Serbia and 
no intention to introduce one. Despite different tendencies during the First Serbian uprising, Russia was 
of the same opinion now. During the preparation of the draft for the Hatt-i-humayun of 1830, the Russian 
representative in Constantinople, Ribaupierre, told Dimitrije Davidović that Serbs should not introduce 
nobility, that the boyars were the main cause of the people’s misfortunes in Wallachia and that meritocracy 
was superior to hereditary titles [36, p. 190–191].
17 This included not only the Sultan’s lands, but the mouqat’a in the broader sense of the word  — 
various sources of government income that could also be leased out to individuals, such as customs, ferries, 
various market tolls and so on. 
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newly formed Serbian courts started giving out tapu [39, p. 5–6]: jurisdiction was gradu-
ally shifting towards Serbian rule, but the property law was still fully Ottoman.18
It is worth noting that, while Miloš acknowledged his government to be hard on the 
people, he did not consider it corrupt and unjust. Quite to the contrary: comparing his 
reign to the anarchy of the First uprising or the abuses of the Turks, he believed himself 
to be the saviour of the people [8, p. 497–498]. While it cannot be denied that his govern-
ment and his efforts had indeed brought the first steps towards freedom from the Otto-
man rule and the best position of Serbia since the 15th century, this cannot be a reason 
to ignore the flaws of his regime. And the same was, indeed, the case during his reign: al-
though the people mostly supported Miloš and acknowledged the good that he had done, 
there were also many complaints about his abuse of power — which led to multiple revolts 
against his rule.
The first of these was the revolt of Sima Marković in 1816–17: the knez was plotting 
against Miloš with the Serbian emigration in Bessarabia. After that was discovered, he 
started a revolt with two other elders; although its beginning was very strong, it was quick-
ly suppressed [41, p. 333–340]. In the spring of 1821 came the revolt of Marko Abdulić 
and Stevan Dobrnjac. Caused primarily by the conflicts of these two elders with Miloš 
over matters of trade and taxation and their yearning for more power at the expense of the 
general struggle for autonomy, it was small in scale and quickly suppressed. Thus, neither 
of these rebellions can be deemed a peasant revolt: both were in essence political.19 It is 
noteworthy that, despite the weakness and personal motivation of the revolt, Miloš tried 
presenting it to the Turks as the spreading of the much more serious uprisings against the 
Turks in Greece, Walachia and Moldavia, in order to demonstrate his own loyalty to the 
Sultan [8, p. 501–517].
In late 1824, Miloš discovered a conspiracy to stage another revolt against him, fo-
cused in the Rudnik nahia.20 Although at first he was led to believe that the emigration 
was plotting against him again, the conspiracy turned out to have been a result of the 
dissatisfaction of the people throughout Serbia. The conspirators were strictly punished, 
some of them executed; the main reason for revolt they had revealed during questioning 
were too high tolls and the abuse of power by Miloš and his brothers [8, p. 565–567; 2, 
p. 58–81].
Although the conspiracy seemed to have been mostly rooted out, it was in January of 
1825 that the greatest rebellion so far broke out, obviously outscaling the others [2, p. 7]. It 
started as a revolt of the people of the Smederevo nahia against corrupt local authorities: 
they demanded that those officials be replaced with individuals of their own choosing, 
without claiming to oppose Miloš himself. However, they were in league with the afore-
mentioned conspirators, and more people were spontaneously joining the revolt as it grew 
(including some of those sent to help subdue it), amassing a considerable army. In order 
to preserve the peace, Miloš was inclined to agree; however, one of those candidates of the 
people, Miloje Popović Đak21, kept spreading the unrest, sending his brother to raise the 
18 Ottoman terminology also remained in force for a long time, particularly in colloquial language 
[40, p. 144].
19 That is not to say that they were not motivated by economic reasons — but those of the holders of 
power, and not the peasant populace [2, p. 48–53]. 
20 For the administrative division of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire, see [42, p. III–IX].
21 Đak used to be a priest, but he rejected his vows during the First uprising, serving for a while as a 
clerk under the new government. As Karađorđe’s state fell apart in 1813, he fled to Pančevo; he returned to 
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Požarevac nahia to arms as well. Đak was slowly gathering an army, pillaging the prop-
erty of many local officials, demanding mostly a reduction of taxes. On January 20th, the 
rebels held an assembly in Topola that compiled a list of demands, which was then sent 
to Miloš: the key points were that the abuse of power should be stopped, taxes and other 
tolls, as well as kuluk, reduced, and free trade allowed — thus showing a more general 
and deeper dissatisfaction of the people.22 Another letter sent to Miloš on the following 
day was signed by “all the poor people of 12 nahias” — i.e. from the whole of Serbia [8, 
p. 568–577; 2, p. 81–126].
Although Đak’s supporters were numerous, they were an angry crowd rather than an 
army; most were more inclined to pillage and run than to fight, and the harsh winter con-
ditions frequently sent them back into the safety of their homes.23 Thus many of them fled 
at the sight of Miloš’s army, commanded by Toma Vučić Perišić, and when Đak himself 
was caught and executed, the rebellion died down quickly [8, p. 577–586; 2, p. 127–151]. 
Still, its consequences were significant: issuing a proclamation, Miloš asked every nahia 
to point out which regulations they found unacceptable, although he pointed out that all 
were made in the interest of the people. The assemblies of the nahias phrased their an-
swers carefully, trying not to criticise Miloš’s government, but merely to complain about 
concrete issues ailing them.24 Miloš relied not only on these answers, but also on the re-
ports of his spies. At the assembly held on the 5th of May in Kragujevac, Miloš proclaimed 
a reduction of taxes. A number of representatives of each nahia were chosen as representa-
tives for further assemblies, but their jurisdiction was soon extended to controlling the lo-
cal authorities and protecting the people against the abuse of their power. Generally, more 
attention was paid to the selection of fair and reliable people as elders from that moment 
on [8, p. 587–599, 605–612; 2, p. 152–182].
It is noteworthy that Đak’s revolt gave Miloš two weapons to use in the fight against 
the Ottomans. Firstly, Miloš once again tried to use a revolt as a political weapon, tell-
ing the vizier that the people had rebelled against Miloš’s turkophilia and the Ottoman 
government in Serbia.25 Secondly, it was the reason for the creation of professional armed 
Serbia in 1815 as a merchant. He seems to have even performed some confidential business for Miloš [8, 
p. 570–571].
22 As Đorđević pointed out, these demands were nothing new, but showed the same problems that were 
noticeable year after year [2, p. 185–187]. Stojančević, on the other hand, believed the monetary obligations 
to have been the hardest for the people to bear, and thus the main cause for dissatisfaction [19, p. 128].
23 It is also possible that Đak’s insistence on trying to negotiate and waiting to see if Miloš would accept 
the demands of the Topola assembly caused the revolt to lose momentum [2, p. 117–118].
24 A good example of Miloš’s reactions to criticism was the affair of Nikola Nikolajević and Lazar 
Todorović, both Miloš’s close confidants, who had in the autumn of 1821 decided to write an anonymous 
essay urging the Prince to correct his flaws, for his own good and the good of the people. However, the rough 
draft of that essay was found in Todorović’s possession, which led to their imprisonment, investigation and 
accusations of them having supported Abdulić’s revolt. While Todorović confessed to writing the essay, 
claiming to have had the best intentions, Nikolajević kept denying his involvement. In the end, Nikolajević 
was killed on Miloš’s command, while Todorović was forgiven and restored to service. Afterwards Miloš 
published a proclamation to the people, asking all who have suffered any form of injustice or were aware of 
some flaws of his government to speak out, so he could solve those problems; however, this was a trick to 
find out what the people thought about him, and those who actually spoke out strongly against him were 
later punished [8, p. 518–547].
25 Similarly, Miloš tried blaming the revolt on the emigrants in Bessarabia (and their connections with 
the Hetairia) in order to prevent their return to Serbia, but with practically no factual basis. Cunibert also 
heavily relied on these Miloš’s claims [2, p. 190–203; cf. 43, p. 170–184].
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forces in Serbia — although they were at first designated as a special sort of policemen, in 
fear of Turkish reprisal for the introduction of an army [8, p. 599–605, 613–614].
Another relevant uprising was Čarapić’s revolt in April 1826, sometimes referred to as 
the ending of Đak’s [2, p. 8]. Đorđe Čarapić,26 formerly one of Miloš’s clerks, was one of the 
participants in Đak’s revolt, but he had fled to Austria after it was subdued, where he had 
plotted another revolt, mostly out of personal dissatisfaction. However, the conspiracy 
was discovered and the leaders of the rebellion quickly slain as soon as it had started [8, 
p. 617–637].
THE HATT-I SHERIF OF 1830 AND 1833 — REVOLTS AS MILOŠ’S WEAPON
Despite the long diplomatic struggle of both Serbian and Russian representatives in 
Constantinople, in the end it was only the direct military action of Russia (the war of 
1828–29) that forced the Ottoman Empire to honour its previous obligations. Even after 
the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) of 1829, the Porte kept trying to dodge its duties; it took 
another round of negotiations, persuasion and bribery to finally secure the result.27 The 
Hatt-i sherif of 1830 was solemnly read in Belgrade on November 30th and December 1st, 
first in Turkish and then in Serbian [36, p. 285–300].
The act brought many long-expected changes to Serbia, making it an autonomous 
province of the Ottoman Empire, a vassal of the Sultan with independent internal rule and 
a hereditary Knjaz (Prince).28 Among other things, it was decreed that the six nahias, torn 
away from Serbia in 1813, would be restored, and that a total sum of taxes would be paid 
for the entire land.29 All Turks except those serving in city garrisons were to move out of 
Serbia within a year: they could either sell their lands to Serbs, or have the incomes from 
those lands be joined with the total sum of tax. No Serb could be forced to serve a Turk in 
any kind of service.30
All of this was supposed to drastically improve the position of the Serbian people; 
however, the Porte was stalling yet again, telling that there were more pressing matters at 
hand, refusing to return the nahias that it had promised and instructing the Turkish popu-
lation (that had already begun selling their property) not to leave Serbia [36, p. 303–409]. 
Even after it was forced to rely on Russian help to subdue the uprising of the viceroy of 
Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, which had threatened to overthrow the Empire [36, p. 410–
418; 46, p. 56–58], it was not willing to calmly keep its word. In the meantime, the Turkish 
authorities in the neighbouring pashaliks — that the nahias that were supposed to be re-
stored to Serbia currently belonged to — were abusing their power and molesting the Ser-
bian population: demanding excessive tolls (including the chiftlik), commanding where 
26 He was the son of Atanasije Čarapić, one of the participants of the First uprising, who had died in 
the battle of Prahovo in 1810, and the nephew of the famous hero Vasa Čarapić [8, p. 617].
27 For details see [32, p. 139–172; 41, p. 271–294, 377–522; 8, p. 1–54, 115–253; 36, p. 1–285; 44, p. 75–
89; 19, p. 135–148]. It’s worth noting that the expenses of the deputation and the bribes for Ottoman officials 
were one of the more relevant reasons for high taxes and tolls of Miloš’s time [19, p. 133–134].
28 Although both forms of the title, Knez and Knjaz, have been used throughout history, in Miloš’s 
time knez was merely the title of a local elder, while Knjaz was reserved for the central ruler; even the use of 
the title knez for elders of lower rank was prohibited in 1827 [45, p. 50; 28, p. 191].
29 That way, the state would pay that amount to the Porte, while the matter of how it would get the 
money and what taxes it would impose on the population would be solely within its competence.
30 The Serbian translations of the texts of the Hatt-i humayun (both of 1830 and 1833) were published 
in [36, p. 604–607, 614–617].
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they had no authority to (such as in issues of marriage) and abducting and raping women. 
It was one of such cases of abduction that Miloš used in late 1832: he staged revolts against 
the corrupt Turkish authorities first in the Kruševac nahia, and then in the remaining five. 
After the revolt broke out, Miloš moved in with his army — allegedly to protect the people, 
in fact to occupy the territories he was entitled to. Although it was highly suspicious, to 
say the least, that the revolt broke out exactly in those six nahias that Serbia was promised 
by the Ackerman Convention, Miloš’s tactic had worked: the Porte agreed to confirm the 
borders of Serbia. [36, p. 418–463; 19, p. 153–154].
The Hatt-i humayun of 1833 was, in essence, an annex that finalised the matters that 
the one of 1830 had left unfinished. The new borders of Serbia were established and the 
taxes calculated accordingly; however, the Turkish population was allowed an additional 
five years to move out, and those residing in Belgrade could stay.31
From that point on, the Ottoman property system was no longer in force in Serbia 
and baština became property again. As Nedeljković has pointed out, that meant that every 
Serb could freely obtain or dispose of his baština, inter vivos as well as mortis causa, and 
had full freedom regarding his agricultural activities on it [1, p. 169–170].32 Of course, 
that did not mean the restoration of the medieval Serbian (feudal) baština: the society 
of that time was too different, and, although many medieval legal manuscripts survived 
in monasteries, after centuries of disuse “very few truly understood what was written in 
them” [48, p. 103]. The system of taxes and tolls was also changing, although the old one 
was completely replaced only in 1835 [3, p. 138–139; 49, p. 13–15].
It bears mentioning that some elders were interested in keeping the Ottoman feudal 
system; rumours began spreading that the sipahi lands and rights will simply be given 
over to Serbian officials. However, Miloš was decisively against this, which he stated on 
the assembly held in Kragujevac in February 1834. Cunibert wrote that he officially pro-
claimed that the sipahi system was “forever destroyed in Serbia and will never be re-es-
tablished in any form” [43, p. 347]. The phrase was since quoted by many authors (e.g. [19, 
p. 194–195]), but it actually does not exist in the official transcript of the speech [50; cf 37, 
p. 53; 5, p. 476]. Still, since the published speech was not given by Miloš, but read in his 
name, it is theoretically possible that he also made a direct address to the people, in which 
he could have pronounced the words that Cunibert quoted. Regardless of whether Miloš 
pronounced these dramatic words, the result was the same. The Ottoman property system 
was formally abolished: a new system of private property was to grow in its stead.33
31 This was the result of a compromise with the Russian government, more inclined to relieve the Porte 
of one of its duties now that they were military allies (and the Ottoman Empire, at least temporarily, a de 
facto protectorate of Russia) after the joint action against the Egyptian rebels [36, p. 464–481]. However, the 
prolonged deadline was again breached, and some of the Turkish population remained in Serbia for decades 
to come; there were also practical difficulties with the selling of lands sometimes [1, p. 192–198].
32 Some special rules remained in force regarding the property of Orthodox churches and monasteries, 
which had a position similar to that of feudal lords under Ottoman rule and preserved it after 1833. The 
position of waqf lands was also different, and in 1839 they were given to Orthodox churches, to which many 
of them had belonged before the conquest [1, p. 183–192; 47, p. 255–256]. However, these complex questions 
deserve to be researched separately.
33 Petrović claimed that this ended the first phase in the creation of free rural property, the termination 
of the sipahi system; it was now time for the second phase — the legal securing of this property [35, p. 82].
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MILETA’S REVOLT AND THE SRETENJE CONSTITUTION OF 1835
Despite the general improvement of the legal position of peasants, there were still 
abuses by many local elders, particularly in the six freshly returned nahias. Miloš was 
taking measures against this (although he was also guilty of abuse occasionally), but they 
were more frequently righting individual wrongs then generally preventing the abuses 
[19, p. 200–211]. Additionally, some of those measures — such as his personal interven-
tion in the judiciary, mostly unsystematic and even whimsical34 — could not be consid-
ered good for the country as a whole [38, p. 366–370; 8, p. 476]. Besides, the economic 
position was yet to be improved, since trade was limited and most peasants had no direct 
way to improve their welfare by selling their cattle. This situation led Slobodan Jovanović 
to remark (perhaps exaggeratedly, but effectively) that in this period there existed free 
peasant property, but no free peasants. Stojančević opposes, claiming that the economic 
burden that peasants bore was related to the increased expenses of the autonomous Ser-
bian state in the making [52, p. 78–79; cf. 19, p. 158–190].
In January 1835, a revolt broke out under the leadership of Mileta Radojković.35 The 
main causes are usually considered to be Miloš’s absolutist government and the dissat-
isfaction of the people with their economic and legal position; however, there is also a 
theory according to which the peasants were generally satisfied with the development of 
both those issues, and that Radojković and his narrow circle of supporters (mostly elders 
who wanted a greater share in government) tricked several thousand people into joining 
by telling them they were going to defend the borders against Turks by Miloš’s command! 
But even according to this interpretation, the main reason was an agrarian one: the distri-
bution of the former aliya and other lands that had belonged to Turks who had moved out 
of Serbia. Within a week, the rebels reached Kragujevac. Miloš entered into negotiations 
with them and promised to convoke an assembly to discuss all matters of relevance to the 
people and state. The assembly was held on Candlemas (Sretenje), and it was on it that 
Miloš gave Serbia its first constitution [19, p. 270–280; 37, p. 125–144].
It must be noted that the Sretenje Constitution made more changes in the character 
of central government (which is not the subject of this paper) than in the agrarian regime, 
and that it was extremely short-lived: it was abolished after approximately six weeks due to 
the pressure from the Porte and Russian and Austrian diplomats, since Serbia, as a vassal 
state, had no right to promulgate a constitution, and its contents were not to their liking [53, 
p. 101–102; 54, p. 78].36 Still, its property regulations are relevant not only because they were 
the first written guarantees of property rights, but even more so because they set a founda-
tion for numerous shorter legal acts that were to come after it and that remained in force. 
All these regulations are contained in Chapter eleven of the Constitution, titled “The 
nationwide rights of Serbs” [47, p. 18–19]. Art. 119 proclaims: “The property of every Serb, 
34 This could be attributed to his general view of himself as a mentor, fatherly figure to the people and 
subsequent wish to get involved even in individual and private matters. [51, p. X–XI].
35 It is noteworthy that Radojković was one of the main agents Miloš used to stage the revolts in 
1832 [36, p. 422–456].
36 It is widely considered that Miloš was glad to be rid of the Constitution, since it limited his power and 
was imposed onto him; however, there is enough evidence that Miloš was planning to create a constitution 
well before Mileta’s revolt, maybe influenced by Vuk Karadžić (and that he tried saving it when the Porte 
intended to abolish it) to refute this idea [54, p. 73–74; 55, p. 40–53; 19, p. 242–243]. Thus the revolt must be 
considered a factor that quickened, and not caused, the arrival of the constitution.
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whatever it might be, is untouchable. Whoever dares to wilfully disturb another’s goods 
and property, and either claim it or impair it, he shall be considered a violator of nation-
wide security, whoever he may be and wherever from he may be.” The following three 
articles proclaim that the government37 has the right to claim someone’s land if they need 
to be used for a public benefit, but only with providing the owner with a fair compensa-
tion, calculated by experts (art. 120); that every Serb may decide to move to other parts 
of the Ottoman Empire or to a foreign land, as long as he obeys the relevant laws in the 
process (art. 121) and that each Serb must pay the determined taxes and help with com-
munal needs, such as the building of bridges and the clearing out of roads (art. 122). Art. 
124 proclaims that no Serb owes kuluk to any government official, save for the erection of 
buildings needed for public use and with fair compensation. 
Finally, art. 128–129 proclaim the general regime of various types of land. The first 
proclaims that “all land owned by the Serbian people belongs to each owner as natural 
property, that anyone can dispose of according to his will”, only with the note that the sale 
of land must be public. The latter proclaims forests (former aliya) to be public goods that 
anybody could use and nobody could claim them for themselves.
Very soon afterwards, a Regulation for lawsuits regarding land was promulgated: all 
such suits were from then on in the jurisdiction of the village kmet and captain — the low-
est, entirely local, courts — on the account of it being the easiest for them to solve such a 
case, having direct access to the property in question.38 In addition to some more detailed 
procedure rules, the regulation also contained a rule for the clearing of land (krčevina), ac-
cording to which such land belonged to the one who had cleared it, regardless of whether 
he had performed the clearing in the area of his own village or not [47, p. 55–66].
A few more regulations improving the position of peasants followed in short succes-
sion during the following few years (1835–37), such as the general proscription of man-
datory labour (except in strictly determined cases, as a form of payment of local tolls to 
the kmet) and other abuses of local power, the proclaiming of both aliya and wastelands 
public lands and the prohibition of letting cattle into the territory of another village, the 
rules for equal division of the aliya between neighbouring villages, another general guar-
antee of the inviolability of private property and the abolition of kuluk [47, p. 57–58, 84, 
85, 150, 217–218].
A different intervention of the state in the area of property rights in 1836 bears more 
detailed mentioning: a regulation that certain items of a debtor’s property could not be 
sold to settle their debts, meant to protect the overly indebted population. City-dwellers 
could not have the house they lived in sold; for rural inhabitants, the minimum included 
not only the house, but also the land around it (baština39), two oxen and a cow [47, p. 119]. 
In the context of increasing economic and social changes, this measure was useful and 
justified [35, p. 89–90].40
37 This refers to the central organs of government — the Knjaz and the State Council.
38 The parties could reach the district courts — the lowest instance mentioned in the Constitution — 
only by appealing to their verdicts. Cf. [47, p. 13]. With the exception of the few written regulations listed 
here, judges primarily relied on customary law [56, p. 456].
39 In this case, baština meant a quantitatively unspecified minimum, and not the whole property [35, 
p. 88–89].
40 It was abolished in 1838 due to some abuses, but similar measures were re-established later and 
revoked only in 1929. This caused an almost century-long hiatus in the development of hypothecary credit 
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Another intrusion of the government in the private property rights in the interest of 
the people was the mandatory process of ušoravanje — the transformation of scattered 
settlements into more compact ones, with streets41 — that was made obligatory in 1837, 
though the process itself had started in Western Serbia in 1830 [47, p. 175–176]. Although 
some people opposed the plan and even moved further into the hills, it was generally 
successful in reallocating the population to more favourable sites and creating larger com-
munities [28, p. 194; 37, p. 80–83].
THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION OF 1838 AND  
THE RESTORATION OF LANDS ACT
Once opened, the constitutional question remained active: finally, Miloš asked the 
Porte to provide a constitution for Serbia. After a lot of negotiations and drafting [19, 
p. 280–289; 37, p. 158–197], a new Constitution was promulgated in December 1838, in 
the form of another Hatt-i humayun, earning the colloquial name Turkish Constitution 
[58, 1–15]. It was shorter and less liberal than the Sretenje Constitution, but it still con-
tained some articles relevant to the issue of land property. Articles 27–28 proclaimed gen-
erally the judicial protection of rights of the Serbian population, remarking that confisca-
tion of property could not be a valid punishment for any crime. Art. 46–47 proclaimed 
that every Serb was the sovereign lord of his property, that he could sell or leave it to 
someone by will and that nothing but a valid judicial verdict could deprive one of this 
right. Art. 49 abolished kuluk, while art. 59 proclaimed that the abolished regime of sipahi 
lands could never again be introduced in Serbia.
Displeased with the political limitations the Constitution imposed on him and un-
der pressure by his opposition (and after yet another revolt, but this time a military one 
in favour of Miloš and against the elders), Miloš abdicated from his throne shortly after 
this, in 1839 [19, p. 289–290; 37, p. 451–481], but this didn’t hinder the reform process; 
on the contrary, it culminated in the Restoration of Lands Act, promulgated by the Re-
gency in July 1839 [58, p. 103–107].42 The act starts with the proclamation of some general 
standards — every Serb’s right to his land, which can and must be protected in courts. 
(Art. 1–2.) However, not all land disputes were treated equally. Extinctive prescription 
was introduced for anything that was done before 1816, during the period of Ottoman 
judiciary, and such an owner could not sue or be restored to his land. It is proclaimed that 
from 1816 until the Hatt-i humayun of 1833, only those who had tapu were considered 
owners of their lands; but from 1833 on the landholders who had no tapu where equally 
considered owners — and thus anyone who had possession of a plot of land became its 
owner. (Art. 4–6.) A rather strange phrasing is used here: “all Serbs became true owners of 
their lands”; Nedeljković remarks that it may be a logical fallacy, but is supposed to signify 
that Serbs became actual owners of the lands they had already considered to be their own 
[1, p. 180].
in Serbia and impeded rural economic development due to more and more parcels of land being of the 
minimal size [37, p. 68; 57, p. 38–43; 39, p. 7].
41 The term comes from šor, the Hungarian word for street [28, p. 193].
42 It’s curious to note that 1839 brought the end to the sipahi system in the Ottoman Empire as well 
[59, p. 55–133; 60, p. 339–346].
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Thus, any tapu from 1816 on was to be considered solid evidence of ownership; from 
1833 on, even if neither party had tapu, the one who held the land first was to be consid-
ered its owner. For the six nahia that were adjoined in 1833, both rules would apply from 
that point on. Of course, any verdicts regarding land ownership which were rendered 
during that time remained in force. (Art. 8–11.) This limitation might seem unjust, but 
it was introduced to strengthen the new legal order and prevent unnecessary lawsuits. 
On the one hand, proving ownership that arose before Miloš’s reign would be exceed-
ingly hard under the circumstances. On the other hand, an official interpretation issued in 
1843 pointed out that it was reasonable to assume that nobody could have usurped land 
during Ottoman rule [61, p. 206–207].
The remaining articles (12–17) contain special rules for certain types of cases. Art. 
13–17 make special remarks for certain types of immovable assets: while there were no 
special terms for “clear” land such as fields and meadows, or for buildings, there were 
some for orchards and vineyards. Thus, if the owner of an orchard did not have tapu, and 
the possessor had, in the meantime, either increased the value of the orchard over half 
the previous value or built a house and settled there, the owner could not get the orchard 
back, but merely receive monetary compensation. In the case of vineyards, the right of an 
owner who had abandoned his vineyard for seven years or more ended through extinctive 
prescription, because an abandoned vineyard would be ruined within that period. These 
rules show that the legislator took into account the particulars of the nature and needs of 
certain types of land.
Art. 12 points out that “there have been cases” of children leaving their property after 
their father’s death (either because of their mother’s remarriage or in order to find work) 
and those lands falling into the hands of another. If such people had no other baština and 
wanted to return to the land of their birth, the law proclaims that “humanity itself asks and 
demands” that land is returned to them, if that can be done without damage (presumably, 
to the new possessor), or, if not, that they receive another equivalent parcel. Such cases, 
moreover, were always to be decided by the Ministry of Justice. Art. 17 states that, “as it 
goes without saying”, those who have willingly sold, given or in any other way transferred 
property of their land to another had no right to demand it back. A well-developed legal 
system would have no need for such regulations, particularly those of art. 17: however, 
they cannot be ascribed to the legislator’s ignorance, since the act seems to notice its own 
redundancy. It is thus obvious that the ratio of these norms was to eliminate any possible 
doubts among the people who were both largely uneducated and used to legal insecurity 
regarding their property, and thus, again, to reduce the numbers of lawsuits that would 
have to be turned down by courts, but would still take up their time.43
CONCLUSION
The relationship between peasant rebellions and land reform in Miloš’s Serbia is a 
complicated one. The Serbian uprisings themselves obviously contained an element of 
agrarian dissatisfaction (though they cannot by any means be reduced to it), and Miloš 
later headed the continuation of the same struggle (both for independence and for land 
reform) by diplomatic means. However, the very people who were his main supporters 
43 However, this was not enough to prevent an overflow of lawsuits in courts [62, p. 28].
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and shared his general goals also frequently rebelled (or at least complained) against the 
methods he was using. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, Miloš and his of-
ficials were known for many abuses of power; on the other, even those measures that were 
introduced in the best interest of the people were frequently unpopular, particularly when 
they meant drastic changes in the existing customs and way of life. Finally, having been 
both at the head of revolts against the Ottomans and the target of the dissatisfaction of his 
people, Miloš was proficient in using revolts as a political weapon by twisting the public 
presentation of their causes or, as in the case of the six nahias, staging them outright.
The whole 1815–1830(33) period was a lengthy preparation for the abolishment of 
the Ottoman system. Once that goal was complete and private property introduced, it 
needed an entirely new legal framework. The creation of that new system might have been 
gradual and unsystematic (only the Civil Code of 1844 will attempt to introduce compre-
hensive written property law that would have supremacy over customary law), but it was 
still a slow yet certain road to legal stability and economic recuperation which Serbia had 
lacked over the tumultuous centuries of Ottoman rule.
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